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Abstract 
This chapter explores a new kind of interventionism in the post-Cold War era and challenges 
faced by global actors in the reconstruction of domestic political authority in the aftermath of 
conflict. The chapter reflects on the meanings and implications of different facets of 
comprehensive external involvement in state-building, nation-building and reconstruction, 
before addressing the theoretical framings of international intervention in terms of 
(post)liberal peace and its critique. What follows is a review and discussion of dilemmas and 
contradictions inherent in the outsiders’ project to pursue liberal peace-based interventions by 
focusing on: sovereignty, legitimacy, ownership and accountability. The chapter turns to 
hybridity as an alternative conceptualisation of international peacebuilding and concludes 
with the policy implications on rethinking wholesale reconstruction of state and society by 
external actors.  
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Introduction  
 
The end of the Cold War has ushered in a new kind of engagement between external actors 
and volatile post-conflict states. Foreign states, multilateral institutions (such as UN, EU, 
NATO and OSCE), and international non-governmental organisations (such as Red Cross, 
Yellow Crescent, and Medicines sans Frontiers) have taken on the rebuilding of states, 
societies and economies in the aftermath of war. The involvement of a multitude of external 
actors in comprehensive governance (Caplan 2005a, 16-44) in foreign states has evolved 
alongside a reconceptualisation of post-Cold War threats whereby weak and failed states have 
emerged as a primary security concern. The understanding of state weakness and fragility as 
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a security threat represents a shift away from great power security competition where threat 
was judged as commensurate with the strength of the state (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2004; 
Rotberg 2007). Within this post-Cold War framework, conflict-affected space, understood as 
a distant ‘zone of chaos’, could no longer be isolated or ignored due to the intensification of 
globalization (Cooper 2004). Increasingly local governance failures have come to be 
perceived as sources of transnational insecurity, illustrated by criminal activity, terrorism and 
mass refugee and migration flows. Tracing insecurity to the state function has at the same 
time shifted the political and policy spotlight on intensified intervention in the aftermath of 
conflict, justified explicitly by the conflict legacy. Wars fought in a global context have been 
characterised by the coalescence of a multitude of state and non-state actors, military as well 
as civilian, legal and criminal, in the war enterprise. Their legacy is the criminalisation of 
both state and society, often combined with instrumental use of ethnic and sectarian identities 
to political ends (Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009). 
 
Nearly two decades of external involvement in rebuilding local political authority in foreign 
environments has  kept the recurrence of violence at bay, as for example in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. However, despite the changing scope and nature of external involvement, the 
goal of building sustainable and legitimate states remains largely elusive. Demonstrations of 
local resistance to external actors and their local projects, epitomised in the Taliban 
resurgence in Afghanistan, point to a crisis in both practice and theory. The international 
intervention in Libya suggests that a military intervention may not necessarily be followed by 
a comprehensive post-conflict engagement, as in Kosovo. And a critique of liberal peace - 
until recently a dominant framework for theorising external intervention – has given rise to 
alternative understandings of the rationale for and the nature of international engagement.  
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This chapter, rather than focusing on the role of international actors in ending violence, 
concentrates instead on the challenges inherent in the post-conflict reconstruction of domestic 
political authority by external actors. It first defines three approaches that have guided the 
involvement of external actors: state-building, nation-building and post-war reconstruction. 
The analysis then turns, to, firstly, the liberal peace framework and, secondly, the critique of 
the neo-colonial dynamics implicit in state-building. The subsequent review of dilemmas and 
contradictions inherent in the external project of comprehensive reconstruction of post-
conflict states and societies focuses on the norms of sovereignty, legitimacy, accountability 
and ownership that are central to state formation and yet problematic within current 
mainstream frameworks of international state-building. This section is followed by a 
discussion of alternative theoretical perspectives. The chapter concludes with a reflection on 
policy implications.   
 
Definitions  
At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, state-building became the centrepiece 
of international peacebuilding guided by the liberal peace idea that predicates stable peace on 
the existence of functioning and effective political and economic institutions. Following the 
logic that the absence and/or weakness of liberal institutions is the main cause of 
underdevelopment and insecurity driving armed conflicts in the global era, mainstream 
scholarship has defined state-building as ‘the creation of new governmental institutions and 
the strengthening of existing ones’ (Fukuyama 2004,17; Paris and Sisk 2009,8; Ottaway 
2002,1004). In this narrow institutional understanding of state-building, the onus on external 
actors is to assist in putting in place institutional architecture across a broad spectrum 
encompassing representative democracy (e.g. elections; constitution, media, judiciary, rule of 
law), and a private market-based economy (e.g. private property, fiscal and monetary 
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institutions, open competition rules). This task is primarily concerned with propping up 
institutional capacity in order to supply adequate human, material and other resources to 
improve the functionality of key institutions, which are undermined by the combined legacies 
of conflict and ancien régime underdevelopment (Fukuyama, ibid. 30).  Conceiving of 
institution building as a technical process of improvement in bureaucratic capacity, the 
relevant scholarly debates have emphasised a diverse set of priorities including the scale of 
required resources and the sequencing and pace of reforms (Ball 2001; Paris 2004; Wolff 
2011). Paradoxically, the institutionalist state-building framework, which dominated the 
state-building scholarship for much of the 2000s, conceived of this process as an apolitical 
process of capacity building and evolved against the backdrop of the (European) nation state-
building paradigm and its pre-eminent concern with forging political community. Nation 
building, according to Fritz and Menocal (2007, 15), is ‘a process of constructing shared 
sense of identity and common destiny, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or 
communal differences and to counter alternative sources of identity and loyalty’. Thus, it is 
embedded in a much larger process of the ‘shaping of economy, polity and society into a 
condition of possible sovereignty’ (Wesley 2008, 373). This broad agenda addressing every 
aspect of societal function has been the subject of voluminous scholarship on post-war 
reconstruction. In its minimalist expression, and echoing the original meaning of the concept 
at its inception in the aftermath of the World War II (Barakat and Zyck 2009), post-war 
reconstruction has been conceived of as ‘the restoration of the conditions of the assets and 
infrastructure […] to the same or similar state in which they were found before the outbreak 
of hostilities’ (Etzioni 2007, 27). The broader definition of post-war reconstruction that 
gained ground in response to the empirical evidence of the scale of the task at hand, 
effectively conflates reconstruction and development, and redefines the goals of 
reconstruction, necessary for the attainment of stable peace as ‘reconstituting legitimacy, re-
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establishing security and rebuilding effectiveness’ (Brinkerhoff 2005, 3). These goals are 
pursued through a number of differentially prioritised, context-dependent processes, which 
include, inter alia, the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, the design of new political 
institutions, security sector reform, macroeconomic stabilisation, social sector reform, 
reconciliation and the psychosocial heeling of traumatised populations. Over time, discourses 
on both state-building and post-war reconstruction have moved in the same direction in 
recognising limitations of the rebuilding of state institutions as separate from the process of 
nation-building (Allen 2010, 414), especially in the context of politicised identity 
characteristic of many contemporary conflicts. The next section takes a more detailed look at 
the framings that govern both mainstream and alternative models and the impact that they 
have on peacebuilding outcomes. 
 
(Post-)Liberal and Critical Framings 
State-building, nation-building and reconstruction represent overlapping and connected 
modalities in the international toolkit for the transformation of states and societies where 
issues of governance, statehood and frameworks of political community are seen to be 
reproductive of conflict and to represent a threat to security and regional and global order. 
This contemporary and normatively dominant interventionist international framework has 
been variously described as the liberal and/or post-liberal peace model. Although, this model 
itself produces both a powerful seam of critique (e.g. Chandler 2010; Cooper 2007; Cooper et 
al 2011) as well as qualified defenders (e.g. Paris 2010, 2002), there is a general consensus 
differentiating contemporary international state-building as a conscious and intentional 
project on the one hand from, on the other, both historical and contemporary state formation 
processes through which Western states emerged and which non-Western states experience 
but in a manner that is constrained by the very processes of state-building and development 
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which continue to be enmeshed in Western-led international structures of power (Bliesmann 
De Guevara 2010, 113). As a result, some critics have contrasted what they consider to be a 
‘classical liberal’ from ‘post-liberal’ framework of statehood, with the former referring to 
forms of autonomy and self-determination which characterised the development of Western 
states and at least initially the principles of post-WWII sovereignty, sovereign equality and 
liberal democratic government whilst the latter refers to the reproduction of shell-like states 
that require permanent management of ‘governance’ through  external diplomatic, 
developmental and humanitarian engagement (Chandler 2010).  
 
This (post-)liberal peace framework operates through a particular understanding of the 
correct relationship between state, society and people and the kind of institutions that are 
conducive to peaceful and harmonious existence and therefore to development. Key to this 
framing is that a stable society cannot emerge without good governance, human rights, 
effective rule of law, a marketised economy and democratic institutions (Richmond 2006). 
According to this logic, these institutions and apparatuses will in turn act as a check upon 
predatory and authoritarian rule, clientelism and corruption whilst also providing for social 
integration (at local, national and global levels) through the socio-economic interdependence 
created by markets. Key to the liberal peace framework has been this core triangulation of 
markets, democracy and governance as a way of developmentally resolving the dynamics of 
conflict and the role of poverty and underdevelopment in the reproduction of cycles of war 
and violence (Duffield 2001).   
 
Just as state-building is dependent on key institutions and concepts that constitute the 
Western experience of liberal democracy, liberal frameworks of nation-building ostensibly 
privilege the construction and consolidation of inclusive civic-secular and cosmopolitan 
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frameworks of identity that have been the outcome of the Western liberal parcelling out of 
politics, socio-economic and cultural activity, human life and conduct into the spheres of the 
public and the private, and of civil society and state. Indeed, civil society remains a key 
liberal concept and policy tool in both state-building and nation-building practices precisely 
because it describes the way in which society has become ‘civilised’ through the carving out 
of a space for the independent and autonomous association of interests that is potentially 
oppositional to both the predatory and authoritarian tendencies of the state (Taylor 1990), as 
well as the unreconstructed forms of religious and/or ethnic identity which have impacted 
upon conflict dynamics in both the West and Non-West. Civil society therefore becomes a 
tool for holding the state accountable through social contractual frameworks and, if 
necessary, for resisting forms of irresponsible state power and particularistic social forces. 
These aforementioned aspects of civil society have led to its revival as a tool for 
emancipation and social transformation at the end of the Cold War (Calhoun 2007, 77-101). 
Nevertheless, this has led to a hierarchical tension within civil society as both concept and 
policy tool, between those civic-secular identities acceptable to liberal order and “certain 
kinds of associational life” such as ethnic and religious identity which must “be reworked or 
even eliminated” (Williams and Young 2012, 9; see also Kymlicka 2005, 22-55; Nadarajah 
and Rampton 2012; Bojicic-Dzelilovic at al. 2013). In this way, the nation-building 
frameworks of liberal peace operate through a privileging of both civil society as a check on 
state power and predation and a rationalised civic nationalism (or post-national belonging) as 
the correct and inclusive form of identification between state, people and territory which is, 
as far as possible, stripped of its affective, gemeinschaftlich or populist dimensions (e.g. see 
Habermas 2001,74-6).  
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Although such frameworks form the core goals for liberal peace and this is borne out in the 
mainstream frameworks of liberal policies, it is in the shifting short-to-mid-term practices of 
post-conflict reconstruction that one is confronted by the compromises and negotiation that 
international liberal actors engage in as a way of navigating the resistances to liberal peace 
frameworks they encounter in regional, national and local contexts. Such reconstruction 
processes have been widely criticised for a tendency to seek accelerated results in everything 
from the misuse of ‘post-conflict’ as a descriptive category for contexts undergoing ongoing 
insecurity, to the counter-productive reinforcing of conflict and therefore state-unbuilding 
that ensue from processes of accelerated democratisation and marketisation (e.g. Paris 2004; 
see also Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Other scholars have also censured reconstruction 
processes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia for the tendency to dilute democracy (Chandler 
2010), to introduce forms of paternalist proxy governance or to compromise the liberal civic-
secular framework through the ethnicisation of peace and thereby of state and social 
structures (Hughes 2011).  
 
A number of different critical approaches including classical liberal, realist, political 
economy, poststructuralist and postcolonial perspectives share a core critique of the (post-
)liberal peace framework. These perspectives state that the (post-)liberal peace is neo-colonial 
in a number of overlapping ways. Firstly, because it represents a novel form of the old 
mission civilisatrice diffused by colonial powers in their encounters with societies in the 
Global East and South (Paris 2002). Secondly, because it continues to reproduce subjugation 
and disqualification of forms of local existence, self-government and community in the 
Global South through the imposition of a Eurocentric, top-down, rationalist, territorialised, 
Westphalian framework and model of statehood and state-society relations (Richmond 2011, 
8-9). Thirdly, that it represents the dominance of Western states and their perception of the 
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emergence of autonomous sovereign states in the Global South as a threat to liberal order. 
According to this understanding, international state-building seeks the perpetual external 
regulation and proxy governance of states that are subject to constant monitoring and the 
potential threat of intervention through justificatory discourses and categories which judge 
such societies and states as dysfunctional or as ‘failed states’ (Chandler 2010, 4-6, 45; 
Woodward 2009). Finally, it effects, according to political economy and post-structuralist 
approaches, a form of ‘global riot control’ in capitalism’s encounter with the unstable and 
conflict-affected ‘borderlands’ of the Global South as it seeks a containment of forms of 
social life perceived as threatening to liberal order and existence  (e.g. Dillon and Reid 2009; 
Duffield 2007; Pugh 2004). These critiques, with the exception of Paris (2010), argue that 
liberal peace and the conflict dynamics it encounters on its periphery are doomed to a process 
of recurrence in so far as the liberal peace framework in its current form cannot produce 
anything other than instability and further conflict due to the social disruption, unravelling 
and state-unbuilding that these interventions effect. In this way liberalism is reproductive of 
its own nemesis, a facet of international state- and nation-building that is manifest in many of 
the tensions, contradictions and paradoxes that haunt its engagement with conflict-affected 
spaces and which are ultimately seen to produce recurrent failures in the construction of a 
viable social contract.  
 
 
Dilemmas and Contradictions  
 
The aim of international interventions in post-conflict areas has been the establishment of a 
legitimate political authority, understood as a democratic, accountable and self-sustained 
state. It is premised on a belief that a state’s capability in dispensing its functions equitably, 
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impartially and effectively is a guarantor of peace and a precondition for the exit of external 
actors. However, a chequered record of state-building projects, from Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
East Timor, points to contradictions and dilemmas that beset external post-conflict 
interventions (Paris and Sisk 2009; Call 2008). The analysis of interaction between global 
and local processes and actors reveals a tension in the reconstruction of political authority by 
international actors, itself reflective of the tensions associated with global governance 
arrangements such as the ‘democratic deficit’ between policy makers and policy 
beneficiaries. These tensions are particularly pronounced in comprehensive reconstruction 
efforts since external actors assume direct control over a range of policies in local states 
while retaining only an indirect link to local constituencies. They are understood through 
concepts that originate in the nation-state context, and are used to describe and qualify the 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled. As an example of global policy, post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts involve multiple stakeholders both at a global and local level. 
Furthermore, these stakeholders look to and are beheld by disparate sources of authority. 
Consequently, the challenges faced by the international community in reconstructing post-
conflict states and societies need to be understood in relation to multiple actors and multiple 
sources of authority in terms of both interveners and policy beneficiaries. The following 
section looks at sovereignty, legitimacy, accountability and ownership as norms used to 
understand the policy of reconstructing local political authority and its challenges.    
 
Sovereignty  
 
The concept of sovereignty is critical to understanding the justification for external actors’ 
intrusive role in domestic affairs of post-conflict states after the end of the Cold War. In state-
reconstruction operations, external actors exercise power, to various degrees, on behalf of the 
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local population. Regardless of the degree to which external actors control executive 
authority, comprehensive interventions in the governance of local states embody a seemingly 
contradictory principle of ‘compromising sovereignty to create sovereignty’ (Woodward 
2001).  The rule of external actors runs against the idea of sovereignty understood to flow 
from the will of the people. Thus conceived, the international community’s intervention in 
local affairs may be considered to be imposed from above and inherently illegitimate. 
However, post-Cold War interventionism in reconstruction efforts has been accompanied by 
reformulation of the bases of international and domestic authority in a rapidly changing and 
increasingly interconnected world.  
 
The involvement of international actors in domestic affairs of post-conflict states goes hand 
in hand with the reconceptualisation of the norm of sovereignty after the end of the Cold 
War; it is seen as the implementation of positive sovereignty. The invocation of positive 
sovereignty has shifted attention to the responsibilities of states to protect their populations 
and their rights, providing justification for international authority and denial of self-
determination (Zaum 2007, 37, 323). States’ responsibility toward their constituencies has 
been directly related to their capacity and effectiveness, so that state sovereignty has become 
‘contingent’ (Duffield, 2007, 28). Chandler (2010, 3) argues that sovereignty is understood  
 
‘not as a ban on intervention but rather as necessitating intervention. The fact that states, 
which are held to lack capacity – or to potentially lack adequate capacity – are making 
sovereign decisions is held to be a major threat both to their own citizens and to the security 
of the international society itself.’  
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Echoing Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Ghani and Lockhart (2008, 3-4) point to ‘sovereignty 
gap’ between de jure sovereignty that dysfunctional states enjoy in the international system as 
opposed to the de facto capabilities of these states in serving their populations and 
contributing to international security. The state’s claim to autonomy based on its capabilities 
has been measured universally against a Western model of reconstruction and development 
measured in terms of liberal political development and economic growth (Suhrke 2007, 
1929), which has been a basis of the critique of external reconstruction as neo-colonial. 
Within the liberal peace paradigm, local deviation from this model is not understood as 
evidence of ineffectiveness of the model itself. Rather, it has served as a justification for 
initiating and maintaining the intrusive intervention, yet without resolving the contradiction 
of ‘benign autocracy.’  
 
Legitimacy 
 
For the external actors, reconstruction of the state, which is legitimate in the eyes of its 
citizens (Ball 2001), is expected to produce dividends in terms of endorsement of their state-
building project. Legitimacy rests on a ‘belief in a government’s right to govern’ (Barker 
1990, 27), and based on this,  acceptance  of a given political order, manifested as active 
compliance with rules which underwrite the  reproduction of that order. Students of 
legitimacy identify different forms of legitimation (Kaldor 2009, 184-8; Holsti 1996, 92-8; 
François and Sud 2006). These correspond broadly to ‘input-oriented’ legitimacy, reflecting 
the sense of cultural and political community, and ‘output-oriented’ legitimacy, deriving from 
the capacity to solve problems and provide public goods (Scharpf 1999). Since legitimacy is 
not reducible to any one of its forms (Barker 1990, 23), this creates a particular challenge in 
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the state-building context of multiple sources, sites and actors involved in the legitimation 
process.  
 
Internationalised state-building presents the ‘dual legitimacy’ problem which maps onto the 
dichotomy between external and internal, or international and domestic legitimacy (Rubin 
2005; Bhatia 2007, 94; Knoll 2008, 294-8). International legitimacy derives from the 
operations of external actors and their takeover of the prerogatives of a sovereign state. It is 
linked to the legal and normative bases of their deployment. By contrast, the domestic 
conception of legitimacy is informed by the perceptions of the beneficiaries of the external 
state-building.  Several scholars of comprehensive reconstruction have explored the 
relationship between international and domestic legitimacy, pointing to their positive 
correlation (Rubin 2005, 103; Morphet 2002). 
 
Critics contend that the very illegitimacy of the state-building enterprise, derived from the 
denial of sovereignty, means there cannot be a legitimate outcome for either external state-
builders or the local state (Ignatieff 2003; Knaus and Martin 2003; Bain 2003; Chandler 
2006; Wilde 2008). As a form of internationalised governance, which is ‘a “dual-key 
governance” setting’ (Knoll 2008, 289), including external and domestic actors, post-conflict 
state-building and reconstruction expose the limited applicability of classical state-centred 
models of legitimacy (Stahn 2008, 531). Accordingly, scholars have explored how political 
constraints, innate in state-building by external actors, can be overcome or compensated; one 
example is the use of discourse and communication to overcome the lack of an ‘input’ 
validation for extraneous agents.  
 
14 
 
The distinction between external and internal legitimacy provides insight into normative and 
structural complexity of legitimation of external interventions in the affairs of states. It also 
offers a narrow understanding of legitimacy of the local state conceived entirely as a by-
product of the legitimacy of external actors and their actions. Such a perspective denies the 
local state the Weberian ‘entitlement claim’ to legitimacy. The study of resistance to external 
liberally-framed intervention in post-conflict states has directed attention to the agency of 
local actors. While such a reversal of the perspective explains why a Western state cannot be 
implanted in a ‘non-Western context’(Bliesemann de Guevara 2010), it falls short of offering 
an alternative to the rational-institutional Weberian state as a desirable norm and as an 
ultimate source of legitimacy for domestic constituency. However, as Kaldor (2009, 193) 
points out, in a global era, the notion of ‘legitimate political authority’ may refer either to a 
state, a municipal or regional government, or even an international administration. According 
to her, key to forging a relationship on the basis of trust which underpins legitimacy and 
ensures compliance with rules is the cosmopolitan outlook that ‘respects both human equality 
and the different ways of being human.’  
 
Accountability 
 
External state-building and reconstruction interventions are characterised by the absence of 
formal accountability provisions available to local populations (Chesterman 2004, 151). This 
applies to interventions that encompass the exercise of authority by external actors on behalf 
of, and in the benefit of, local populations, as in Kosovo, where UNMIK effectively acted as 
a government in the immediate post-NATO intervention period, as well as those with a ‘light 
footprint’, as in post-2003 Liberia, where formal executive authority remained with the 
Liberian authorities but did not constrain international intrusion in policy matters (cf. 
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Andersen 2010, 129-135). Not unlike considerations of legitimacy, accountability becomes a 
problem because of an indirect relationship between foreign governors and local 
constituencies, despite a direct impact of policies pursued by international actors. As Sperling 
(2009, 8-17) points out, globalisation has altered accountability relationships, traditionally 
conceived as a relation between ‘agents’ (elected officials), and ‘principals’ (voters). In the 
context of global governance, and what Borowiak (2011, 152) calls the ‘unwinding of 
sovereign accountability’, questions have been raised as to whom representatives of 
international institutions should be politically and criminally accountable and how.  
 
For international actors, upward political accountability has taken precedence over the 
downward accountability towards those affected by their actions. For example, transitional 
administrators, as implementers of comprehensive reconstruction efforts, have been 
accountable upwards to bodies that appoint them (Caplan 2005b). Thus, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the High Representative is responsible to the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC), the ad hoc international body of 55 states and organisations that oversees international 
administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to the UN Secretary General. When it comes to 
criminal accountability, a security dimension of comprehensive post-reconstruction efforts 
has highlighted the ‘fragmentation of responsibility’ (Kearney et al. 2011, 225) implicit in the 
established principle that any enforcement or disciplinary action for international police and 
military personnel remains a matter for the authorities of their home countries rather than for 
international missions in which they serve. Difficulties in conducting proceedings far away 
from the site of the incident also reduce the likelihood of conviction, which, in turn, 
undermines the legitimacy of security structures amongst the local population. An illustrative 
case in point is the lack of sanction for UNMIK officers who shot two protesters at a rally by 
a civil society movement Vetëvendosje! (Ibid. 226-9).  Meanwhile, other alternative avenues, 
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such as local and global civil society and media, or an office of an ombudsman, have been 
relied on to expose transgressions. Nonetheless, these alternative channels have remained 
only a substitute for formal accountability mechanisms, without the establishment of 
responsibility, due process and punitive measures, what should be key defining features of 
international policy-makers’ democratic accountability (Borowiak 2011, 3-21). 
 
Furthermore, local power holders nominally remain accountable to their publics for policies 
under their control, but this has not necessarily increased their responsibility. A maze of 
relationships between external and domestic actors has incentivised each side to take credit 
for popular outcomes, while allocating blame for unpopular ones to the others (Andersen 
2010, 148). In sum, accountability - a pillar of democratic legitimation and a means to 
building local capacity- has also led to abrogation of responsibility and delegitimation of 
international efforts. In fragile, often divided, post-conflict societies, a lack of accountability 
has fuelled nationalist reactions that have further obstructed reconstruction efforts. 
 
Ownership 
 
Local ownership is an ultimate aim of the reconstruction effort, given that it represents a 
rationale for the exit and disengagement of external actors. However, rather than being a part 
of a solution, the concept of ownership has itself become a point of controversy in both the 
theory and practice of external state reconstruction since there is no coherent answer to a 
question ‘who owns what?’ (Donais 2012, 139).  
 
First and foremost, the contestation concerns the nature of involvement and participation on 
the part of local actors. Ownership is variably interpreted in terms of consultation and 
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inclusion of local actors in the policy process or as power and control over policy that ‘means 
a power shift, which goes far beyond existing practices’ (Reich 2006, 15). Suhrke (2007, 
1292) responds by arguing that, regardless of a power shift, ‘local ownership means ‘their’ 
ownership of ‘our’ ideas, rather than the other way round’. Neither is there any greater clarity 
about who is or should be the local subject. On the one hand, the dilemma of a local ‘owner’ 
concerns the levels of local governing structures, including national, regional and sub-
regional or municipal authorities. On the other, consideration of the local owners of policy 
processes is more difficult in a fragmented post-conflict environment, characterised by deep 
ethnic, political, and geographic cleavages impacting upon both state and non-state spheres 
(Donais 2012, 40-77; Sheye 2008, 63-4). An additional challenge is the informal exercise of 
power behind the façade of formal institutions, which can be more legitimate in the eyes of 
the local populations (Reno 2008, 145). Therefore, to the extent that the purpose of external 
reconstruction is to build a capable and sustainable state, the dilemma of re-balancing 
authority in favour of the locals in external interventions also carries the risk of empowering 
the spoilers (Cf. Narten 2009, 260-262).     
 
At the same time, the local ownership debate reflects a contested normative understanding of 
external reconstruction – either as liberal or neo-colonial project. The discourse of local 
ownership is intended to underwrite the liberal assumption of contemporary interventions as 
distinct from great power colonialism (e.g. Paris 2002, 652). Chesterman argues that attempts 
to frame the concept of ownership as a means rather than an end of external state-building are 
misleading, given that the lack of capacity for self-government was the original reason for the 
introduction of an intrusive intervention (2004, 144). Consequently, the ideal is that the 
contradiction found in the simultaneity of external rule and local ownership is to be resolved 
through a gradual transition in the course of intervention. The concept of ownership also 
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informs a critique of external state reconstruction as a neo-colonial enterprise. Thus, for 
Chandler (2006, 11-8), the language of ownership, and the related concept of empowerment 
of ‘locals’, plays a key role in understanding state-building as ‘empire in denial’, that is a 
hierarchical type of rule characterised by coercion despite its appearance of being consensual. 
This denial of capacities for autonomy, according to Hughes and Pupavac (2005), is related to 
the pathologisation of local populations whose portrayal as dysfunctional has served to 
legitimise intrusive international intervention that is ostensibly functional.  
 
Originating in the development literature, appropriated in the peacebuilding theorising, the 
concept of ownership is associated with enhancing the effectiveness of international 
intervention. At a minimum, this rationale assumes that a local voice will ensure the 
appropriateness, and hence, sustainability, of reconstruction as well as increase the local stake 
in an externally-led project (Cf. Egnell 2010, 476). Tainted by a combination of a lack of 
clarity of its meaning, and the attendant challenges of its implementation, the concept of 
ownership has been a contributing factor to deeply fraught relationships between external and 
local actors (Martin et al., 2012). Local populations’ calls for the exit of outsiders has, 
paradoxically, been justified by undelivered promises of transfer of power to local authorities 
rather than enhancing local capacity, which is seen as a guarantee of security (Cf. Caplan 
2012, 315).  
 
In sum, tensions in external state-building, as discussed through the prism of sovereignty, 
legitimacy, accountability and ownership, have proved irresolvable from the liberal 
perspective. They have fuelled the divide between proponents and critics of liberal peace, 
often set in ‘zero-sum’ terms, resulting in the present crisis of theories and practise of 
external state-building. In particular, liberal frameworks have been challenged by the 
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complexity of governance in the global context, including the multiplicity of actors in the 
global political space and the plurality of spaces/scales of politics.  
 
New Emerging Alternatives: Hybrid and Post-liberal Peace, the ‘Local’, the ‘Everyday’ 
and Beyond 
As a means of confronting the previously described paradoxes and tensions and the tendency 
for the liberal peace to be confronted by resistance, crisis-ridden peace and state-building 
efforts and therefore freshly reproduced forms of conflict in the wake of intervention and/or 
engagement, a number of scholars have demanded a shift in the study and policy frameworks 
of ‘peacebuilding’. Taking their cue from postcolonial scholarship on hybridity and 
ambivalence (e.g. Bhabha Homi 1994), studies of the quotidian and everyday (e.g. De 
Certeau 1984; Le Febvre 1992; Heller 1985) and pluralist conceptions of peace, these 
scholars seek a way out of what they see as the top-down and domineering frameworks of 
hegemonic liberalism towards what they frequently term ‘post-liberal’ or ‘hybrid peace’.  An 
alternative peace framework, which is more empathetic and emancipatory because it flows in 
the opposite direction to ‘liberal peace’, from the communities most directly affected by 
conflict, emergent as it is,  is in part a ‘bottom-up’ approach which also emphasises the 
interface between these local and indigenous actors and the international spheres of liberal 
peace.  
 
Consequently, these approaches seek to challenge the commonplace assumption that peace-
building knowledge and practice must be based around liberal frameworks such as 
reconstruction pursued through a particular model or template of (the Westphalian) state and 
(civil) society. Instead, both the study of and engagement with local spaces and the practices 
and strategies of diverse populations directly locate agency for peace in the way that 
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communities deploy everyday coping strategies for protection, for intra-and inter-community 
engagement and access resources for peacebuilding and development at local levels, often in 
ways that ward off, subvert, resist or adapt hegemonic state-building frameworks and 
practices (Mac Ginty 2011,84-90). Typical examples that have been cited include forms of 
everyday local community protection in Northern Ireland, what Audra Mitchell has termed 
‘threatworks’ (2010,19-22), or the way in which non-liberal actors produce alternatives to the 
civic frames of liberal peace frameworks such as Hezbollah in Lebanon (Mac Ginty 
2011,181). 
 
These models therefore frequently stress the local and everyday as a space of indigeneity, 
authenticity, tradition and ‘feeling’ typified by religious, ethnic, caste, gender and status 
identities and communities that are either disqualified or marginalised by liberal frameworks  
(MacGinty 2011; Richmond 2011), which is to be contrasted with the aforementioned 
rationalised, Westphalian, territorial and governmental architecture of international order. It 
is these spheres that meet to construct hybrid interactions, which can lead to co-option of 
local identities and communities within the dominant frame of liberal peace-builders (e.g. the 
Loya Jirga in Afghanistan is a classic example: see Mac Ginty 2011, 62) but also resistance 
and subversion on the part of local communities as well as dissonance and antagonism in the 
course of their engagement. However, as the hybrid peace scholars also assert, it also 
provides the potential for an alternative (and more self-aware) hybrid interaction between 
international and local actors and structures, which is more open and attentive to the 
harnessing of local and everyday agency and to peace as a plural field rather than a monopoly 
of liberal universal frameworks (Van Leeuwen et al 2012). In this way disqualified practices 
and the hitherto hidden script of local peacebuilding can be utilised not to displace the role of 
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international actors but to produce a greater sensitivity to and mobilisation of local 
peacebuilding practices. 
 
Indeed, the hybridity framework has been used to try and revitalise the centrality of the social 
contract within international state-building. Rather than adopting the top-down frameworks 
of civil societal reconstruction, democratisation and marketisation, some scholars have 
argued for a social contract built out of the interactions of hybrid peace itself (e.g. Richmond 
2011, 15; Roberts 2011, 8-10). In this framework, the ‘social contract’ so elusive in the 
aforementioned liberal frameworks is instead constituted by a direct engagement between 
international and local actors. According to this approach, the focus on international 
engagement at the local level facilitates the bypassing of a number of obstacles and problems 
present in the liberal peace paradigm. For some authors, this evidently includes the ability to 
bypass the state and national elites who currently dominate the international-to-local interface 
and who co-opt or disrupt the potential for a more bottom-up, organic and direct interface in 
the construction of an international-to-local social contract. Here, the construction of an 
international-local social contract would provide a responsive relationship between 
communities and structures of governance and development at the local level. For other 
authors, adopting a more traditional linear perspective, this can potentially serve as a first 
phase in the construction of more responsive governance structures that can be integrated into 
broader, more stable, traditional state structures (Roberts 2011, 15). Clearly implicit in the 
overall contractarian emphasis approach is a search for ‘authenticity’ in the social sphere, 
given the tendency for liberal peace frameworks to construct ‘civil society’ through a very 
Eurocentric lens and to build the state from the ‘outside’.  
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Despite the novelty and the utility of the critique that the ‘hybrid peace’ approach provides, 
there are a number of pressing problems with the framework. The first is that despite its 
frequent self-description as post-liberal, it is more often a problem-solving critique of the 
liberal peace as the aforementioned social contract frameworks indicate. Secondly, despite 
strenuous attempts to either claim that the framework’s categorisation of the local and 
international is purely descriptive or that the framework is deliberately seeking to avoid the 
romanticisation of the ‘local’, there is a tendency to portray local communities as ‘traditional’ 
and pre-modern through the denial that frameworks of power that inhere in the international 
and Western sphere are at work in the locales of the East and South. As a result the hybrid 
peace repeats the subjugatory categories of colonial and neo-colonial power-knowledge. 
Thirdly and relatedly, the call for a closer international-local engagement or even social 
contract does not really address past critiques that have indicated the divide between the 
insurance and welfare frameworks of Western states and the lack of reciprocity and social 
responsiveness of international developmental and humanitarian engagement (Duffield 
2007,19-24). Moreover it does not address the constant claim that the state structures created 
by international state-building are ultimately cosmetic, shell-like forms devoid of even 
rudimentary sovereignty (Chandler 2010).  Fourthly, critics will also point to the lack of 
alternatives to liberal peace and the fact that a focus on post-liberal, local, everyday and 
facets of peace may end up privileging illiberal conduct through, for instance, the reinforcing 
of authoritarian and autocratic rule and/or repressive customary local practices (Paris 2010, 
357-361; see also the acknowledgement of this risk by Mac Ginty 2008, 150). Lastly, there is 
an obvious tendency in the ‘hybrid’ peace and ‘everyday’ peace approaches to neglect the 
way in which conflict is also hybrid and present in the world of everyday existence so that a 
focus on hybrid peace must also acknowledge hybrid war more extensively than it currently 
does (Nadarajah and Rampton 2012).  
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Conclusion 
What is clear then is that the international state-building project, dominated as it has been by 
liberal frameworks, has been confronted by a series of challenges to its epistemic, conceptual 
and practical frameworks, evident in the failures and limited successes that it has generated in 
the recent period. This crisis in the expansion of liberal order is to a great degree a result of 
what has been described as “input incongruence” arising from the multiplicity of actors and 
dynamics in contention that impact upon state-building and the resistance it encounters in a 
globalised world (cf. Zürn 2012). The response to this crisis has produced both a recent, 
emerging approach advocating a wider participatory hybrid, local and quotidian peace as well 
as a long-running powerful set of critiques from liberal institutionalist, classical liberal, realist 
and political economy perspectives. Yet in a sense, these approaches frequently privilege 
certain processes, institutions and/or local and/or international actors, which dominate the 
frameworks of their understanding of who should participate and how in state-building, 
whether through the state-society relation or a social contract fashioned between the spheres 
of the local and international. What therefore needs to be addressed in a more fundamental 
way in both academic knowledge and policy frameworks is how a more holistic framework 
can be developed to encompass the complex, multipolar networked mesh of discourses, 
processes, actors and identities. A framework furthermore, which will have to encourage 
greater participation by avoiding the hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion characteristic of 
the liberal (or hybrid) peace whilst simultaneously avoiding the tendency for international 
state-building to generate the counter-productive illiberal effects it seeks to overcome. The 
development of such a framework will also have to involve the acknowledgement that 
solutions premised on a return to a (mythic) territorial, statist order cannot (by virtue of that 
order’s epistemological framework) even begin to apprehend or engage with the profound 
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complexity of the global and local actors and processes at work across conflict, peace and 
state-building. 
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